

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER
AD505493
NEW LIMITATION CHANGE
TO Approved for public release, distribution unlimited
FROM Distribution: Further dissemination only as directed by Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC. 20310, 29 Oct 1975, or higher DoD authority.
AUTHORITY
OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER	
AD505493	
CLASSIFICATION CHANGES	
TO:	unclassified
FROM:	confidential
LIMITATION CHANGES	
TO: Distribution: Further dissemination only as directed by Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC. 20310, 29 Oct 1975, or higher DoD authority.	
FROM: Controlling DoD Organization... Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development [Army], Washington, DC. 20310.	
AUTHORITY	
29 Oct 1975, GDS, per DoD 5200.1-r; DoDD 5230.24, 18 Mar 1987	

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

BEST

AVAILABLE

COPY

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.

Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.

② Operational rpt for period ending 31 Jul 69.

CONFIDENTIAL



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

18 OACSFOR/

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (24 Oct 69)

FOR OT-UT-693179

28'
11 31 Aug 69
12 64 p.
29 October 1969

SUBJECT: ~~Report~~ ⑥ Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Vietnam, Period Ending 31 July 1969 (U) ⑧

SEE DISTRIBUTION

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794, ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to OACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals
 - US Continental Army Command
 - US Army Combat Developments Command
- Commandants
 - US Army War College
 - US Army Command and General Staff College
 - US Army Adjutant General School
 - US Army Air Defense School
 - US Army Armor School
 - US Army Aviation School
 - US Army Chaplain School
 - US Army Chemical School
 - US Army Civil Affairs School
 - US Army Combat Surveillance School
 - US Army Electronic Warfare School

NOV 19 1969

Regraded unclassified when separated from classified inclosure.

CONFIDENTIAL

1003650

1473
me

AD505493

13 No. 1
DCG FILE COPY


CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

- US Army Engineer School
- US Army Field Artillery School
- US Army Infantry School
- US Army Intelligence School
- US Army Medical Field Service School
- US Army Military Police School
- US Army Missile and Munitions School
- US Army Ordnance School
- US Army Quartermaster School
- US Army Signal School
- US Army Southeastern Signal School
- US Army Special Warfare School
- US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

- Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
- Deputy Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Research and Development
- Assistant Chiefs of Staff
- Chief of Engineers
- The Surgeon General
- Chief of Military History
- The Provost Marshal General
- OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
- Director, Defense Research and Engineering
- Office, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Commander In Chief, US Strike Command
- Commanding Generals
 - US Army Materiel Command
 - US Army STRATCOM
 - US Army Electronics Command
 - US Army Weapons Command
 - US Army Flight Training Center
- III Corps
- US Army Vietnam
- Deputy Chief of Staff, Air Force, Plans & Operations
- Commandant of the Marine Corps
- The Air University Library
- Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
- Defense Documentation Center
- Security Officer, Hudson Institute
- USAF Project RAND
- Commanding Officers
 - US Army Limited War Laboratory
 - US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
 - US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center





CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96378

AVHGC-DST

31 AUG 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR 65 (R1) (U)

THRU: Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities

a. (U) COMMAND.

(1) Commanders.

CG, USARV

1 May 69 - 31 July 69

GEN Creighton W. Abrams

DCG, USARV

1 May 69 - 31 July 69

LTG Frank T. Mildren

CG, Engineer Troops, Vietnam (Provisional)

1 May 69 - 1 Jul 69

MG David S. Parker

FOR OT UT
693179

Inclosure

1

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

CG, US Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam

1 May 69 - 1 Jul 69

BG E. P. Yates

1 Jul 69 - 31 Jul 69

BG Robert M. Tarbox

(2) Distinguished Visitor Summary. During the reporting period,
49 parties of distinguished visitors visited this headquarters.

SIGNIFICANT VISITORS TO USARV

PERIOD: 1 May 1969 - 31 July 1969

<u>NAME/DATE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>
Mr. Ong Kah Kok 1 - 5 May 1969	Civilian Director of Logistics, Ministry of Interior and Defense, Singapore
Mr. Lowell Goodhue (GS18E) 5 - 9 May 1969	Logistics Management Institute
Mr. Armand Weiss (GS16E) 5 - 9 May 1969	Logistics Management Institute
The Right Reverend Arnold M. Lewis 6 May 1969	Episcopal Bishop to the Armed Forces
BG Charles W. Ryder 10 - 11 May 1969	ACofS, G-1, USARPAC
GEN Ralph E. Haines, Jr. 10 - 16 May 1969	CINCUSARPAC
MG Charles T. Horner, Jr. 11 - 15 May 1969	CG, 2d Logistical Command
LTG Lee, Sae Ho 12 May 1969	CG, ROKV

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

BG Wilson M. Osteen
13 - 17 May 1969

Asst for Veterinarian Svcs, OTSG

Mr. J. K. Fasick (GS17)
15 May 1969

Associate Director, Defense Div, GAO

Mr. Hyman S. Zaretsky (GS17)
15 May 1969

Director, Supply Management Policy,
OASD (I&L)

Mr. Coleman P. Cook (GS16)
15 May 1969

Spec Asst for Planning, OASA (I&L)

Mr. Wayne A. Smith (GS16)
15 May 1969

ODCSLOG, DA

BG Hugh A. Richeson
16 May 1969

DCG, 1st Logistical Command
(Designate)

LTG Arthur S. Collins, Jr.
17 - 23 May 1969

ACSFOR, DA

Mr. David C. Hardison (GS18)
19 - 23 May 1969

USACDC Scientific Advisor

LTG Richard P. Klocko, USAF
20 May 1969

Director, Defense Communications
Agency

MG John M. Wright, Jr.
23 - 25 May 1969

CG, 101st Abn Div (AM)(Designate)

Mr. John Kirk (GS18)
25 May 1969

Asst to Deputy Director of Research
& Engineering for SEA Matters, DOD

Argentine Military Observer Group
(Party of Five)
25 May 1969

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

BG Warren K. Bennett
26 May 1969

CG, 199th Lt Inf Bde (Designate)

MG Charles J. Denholm
30 May 1969

CG, United States Army Security
Agency

BG George A. Godding
30 May 1969

CG, United States Army Security
Agency, Pacific

BG Leo D. Kinnard
30 May 1969

CG, II FFORCEV Artillery

BG Albert E. Hunter
2 June 1969

CG, USASC, Qui Nhon (Designate)

Mr. Phillip M. Swatek (GS18)
4 June 1969

Director, Pacific Region, Federal
Aviation Agency

COL (P) Dennis P. McAuliffe
5 June 1969

Asst Div Cmdr-B, 1st Inf Div

Mr. Leonard Sullivan, Jr., (GS18)
6 June 1969

Deputy Director of Research and
Engineering for SEA Matters, DOD

BG Maurice J. Halper
6 - 10 June 1969

Comptroller, USARPAC

LTG John D. Lavelle, USAF
11 June 1969

Director, Defense Communications
Planning Group, OSD

Mr. David R. Israel (GS18)
11 June 1969

Deputy Director for Engineering,
Defense Communications Planning
Group, OSD

BG James M. Vande Hey, USAF
15 June 1969

Deputy Chief of Staff, MACV

Dr. T. S. George (GS18)
19 June 1969

Scientific Advisor, CINCPAC

AVHGC-DST

**SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)**

**MG Kim, Yong Hyu
24 June 1969**

Deputy Commander, ROKV

**MG Lee, Kun Yung
24 June 1969**

**Deputy Commander, ROKV
(Designate)**

**Mr. Lavern J. Duffy (GS18E)
25 June 1969**

**Professional Staff Member of the
Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigation, Senate Committee on
Government Operations**

**MG Jack J. Wagstaff
25 June 1969**

Deputy Commander, MACTHAI

**Mr. Clyde D. Hardin (GS18E)
2 - 9 July 1969**

**Asst for SEA to ASA (R&D),
OASA (R&D)**

**BG Henry C. Schrader
6 - 9 July 1969**

**Director, Management Information
Systems, Ofc Asst Vice Chief of Staff**

**LTG Michael S. Davison
9 - 14 July 1969**

DEPCINCUSARPAC

**MG Hugh F. Foster, Jr.
11 - 14 July 1969**

**CG, United States Army
Communications Systems Agency**

**BG Geoffrey Cheadle, USAF
15 July 1969**

ACofS, J-6, MACV (Designate)

**MG Hal D. McCown
17 July 1969**

DCG, II FFORCEV

**BG Harold E. Parker
23 - 27 July 1969**

**Asst Judge Advocate General
for Military Law**

**BG Morton M. Jones, Jr.
25 July 1969**

**Deputy Director, Defense
Communications Planning Group,
Defense Communications Agency**

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

b. (U) PERSONNEL, ADMINISTRATION, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE.

(1) Military Personnel Management. Since January 1969 the overall USARV re-enlistment rate has continued to increase. For the period 1 January 1969 through 31 May 1969, USARV increased its re-enlistment standing from 7th place to 5th place among other USARPAC commands. Effective 22 June 1969, 19 major subordinate commands were authorized a total of 43 re-enlistment NCO positions. One re-enlistment officer position was authorized as an over strength position. On 1 July 1969, USARV inaugurated a re-enlistment incentive awards program. The system requires that competing major subordinate commands achieve a specific objective, which is 0.5 percent of the unit's average enlisted strength for the past three months. To qualify for an award, 90 percent of the RA career category eligibles must be re-enlisted. During the period 10 - 12 July 1969, USARV conducted a command re-enlistment conference. The conference identified methods which would improve USARV re-enlistment rates.

(2) Morale and Personal Services. Chaplain Activities. There was a 19 percent increase in the number of personnel receiving character guidance instruction from the previous quarter. Attendance at religious services increased 9 percent over the previous quarter. The number of services conducted per chaplain per week was 7.4 during this quarter compared to an average of 6 per week for the previous quarter. Contributions by chaplain funds to Vietnamese religious and charitable causes, during the 4th Quarter FY 69, totaled \$65,701.92.

(3) Civilian Personnel Management. Labor unrest at the Port of Saigon during April and May 1969 involved the CVT Dock Workers Union and more than 300 direct-hire employees of the 125th Transportation Command. Work stoppages were the result of the employees' reaction to reduced work schedules of direct-hire employees, implemented on 13 April 1969. Between 13 April and 3 May 1969, attendance of the 125th Transportation Command's direct-hire employees was sporadic. After an interim settlement, all employees reported for work on 4 May 1969. Incidents stemming from reductions in the number of contract cargo checkers resulted in a strike at the Port of Saigon,

3
AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Newport, and Cat Lai. This strike, called by the union on 7 May 1969, resulted in the absence of about 300 direct-hire and 700 contract employees. US military personnel were used to move essential military cargo. On 8 May 1969, the Director of Cabinet, GVN Ministry of Labor was advised that plans were being developed to move essential military cargo with military personnel in the event of future disruptions. This action was necessary to provide the support required by US, Free World and RVN Forces.

(4) Medical Services and Medical Supplies.

(a) The President's announcement to redeploy 25,000 troops by the end of August 1969 accelerated the planning which had already been initiated between this headquarters and the 44th Medical Brigade to ensure the continuation of optimum medical support when the reserve medical units, three hospitals and eight TOE 8-500 cellular teams redeploy in July and August. Two hospitals, whose current workload did not justify retention in their location, were programmed to replace redeploying hospitals. These were the 91st Evacuation Hospital at Phu Hiep, which replaced the 312th Evacuation Hospital at Chu Lai, and the 17th Field Hospital, at An Khe, which replaced the 311th Field Hospital. The 74th Field Hospital, which operates the prisoner of war hospital at Long Binh, will be replaced by an augmented medical company (clearing) attached to the adjacent 24th Evacuation Hospital. The workload of the cellular teams is being absorbed by the realignment of similar resources where justified. On 1 June 1969, there were 4,862 beds in the USARV hospital system. The loss of the three reserve hospitals, plus realignment of 44th Medical Brigade resources to continue the operation of hospital facilities in these three locations, will reduce the number of operating beds to 4,132. The redeployment of reserve units is progressing satisfactorily, and no disruption or degradation of medical care in USARV is anticipated.

(b) An optometry conference was held at USARV Headquarters on 14 May 1969. The primary purpose was to provide all optometry officers with the latest information on personnel actions, medical materiel, optical laboratory operations, and to provide a forum for the interchange of ideas between officers serving in different units throughout the country.

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) A USARV forensic psychiatry conference was held at USARV Headquarters on 16 and 17 May 1969, under the sponsorship of the 935th Medical Detachment (KO), 93rd Evacuation Hospital, 68th Medical Group. The meeting was attended by mental hygiene staff members of the combat divisions, the 44th Medical Brigade, and Staff Judge Advocates from all jurisdictions throughout Vietnam. A panel of psychiatrists and lawyers discussed practical issues surrounding the psychiatric evaluation of the accused and the determination of mental responsibility. The trial counsel, defense attorney, law officer and psychiatrist were represented in a mock trial which presented the examination and cross examination of a psychiatrist.

(d) The number of DOD operated aid stations and dispensaries was reduced on 1 June 1969. Early in 1969 this headquarters initiated a review of DOD contractor-operated aid stations and dispensaries to determine where services duplicated those of military medical facilities. This review, coupled with area medical surveys conducted by the 44th Medical Brigade, showed that medical facilities are operated by Pacific Architects and Engineers (PA&E), Philco-Ford, Hanjin Transportation Company, Page Communications Engineer, Vinnell Corporation, Raymond, Morrison-Knudsen/Brown and Root-Jones (RMK/BRJ) and Alaska Barge Company. In most cases, each firm claimed to treat US and Third Country Nationals as well as local national civilian employees. At many installations two or more contractor operated medical facilities, in addition to military medical facilities, offered the same service. The United States Army Procurement Agency Vietnam (USAPAV) was directed to renegotiate the pertinent contracts to eliminate this duplication. PA&E's contract was the first to be renegotiated (1 June 1969). Fifty-seven sites were visited and jointly reviewed. As a result, 19 PA&E aid stations and 6 PA&E dispensaries are being closed and the establishment of 13 unneeded medical facilities was prevented. The remaining DOD contracts will be reviewed in the same manner. It is anticipated that results will be comparable to those obtained with PA&E. Operating contractor medical facilities where military medical facilities are available results in the government paying contractors to provide service already available from military agencies. This action will result in considerable monetary savings and will tighten control of DOD contractor facilities to further reduce the black marketing of medical supplies and drugs.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(e) The Medical Consultants' Visits program (MEDCON) was further developed during the period. The program affords the opportunity for direct professional communications between those responsible for the patient in the chain of evacuation. The 1st Infantry Division is now rotating each battalion surgeon through a two-day dermatology program in Long Binh. The gastroenterologist of the 8th Field Hospital visited seven separate dispensaries and provided assistance for the field management of patients with diarrheal disease.

(f) The construction of a new dental clinic in Saigon was completed during the reporting period. The dental equipment remains to be installed. This clinic will be operated by the 36th Medical Detachment and has the capacity of providing working space for thirteen dental officers and two oral hygienists.

(g) Eight helicopter-mounted insecticide spray rigs were received in June. These units will be distributed to preventive medicine units throughout RVN. The rigs are designed to be mounted on UH-1 model helicopters for the aerial application of insecticide at low altitude on small base camps, landing zones and like areas which are either too small or insecure to warrant the use of the USAF C-123 aircraft. This new equipment represents a valuable supplement to the prevention effort against malaria and other insect-borne diseases.

(h) Action was taken to simplify billing and accounting procedures for US and Third Country National civilian employees of DOD contract agencies treated at non-hospital medical facilities. Each dispensary providing out-patient care to these "pay patients" was directed to establish and maintain a daily log of the individuals treated. At the end of each month, a summary is prepared and forwarded to the Pay Patients' Account Officer (PPAO) of the field or evacuation hospital to which patients requiring hospitalization are normally transferred. The receiving PPAO is then responsible for billing and collection procedures for the medical services provided.

c. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

(1) (C) Significant Enemy Activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(a) General. Enemy activity throughout the country was generally at a low level. Increased activity was noted with high points during 11-12 May, 5-7 June, 15-19 June, and 5-6 July. The high point anticipated during the last half of July did not materialize. Enemy troops refrained from large scale engagements and withdrew to their base camp sanctuaries during the latter part of the quarter.

(b) I Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy initiated activity in the zone was generally light during the quarter. He had completed preparations for the Spring-Summer offensive, however, aggressive allied actions in which large caches of rockets were found, forced him to postpone that offensive. He has continued to react and resist US/Free World Force operations in the A Shau Valley and the areas of the Western Military Regions of Tri Thien Hue. Captured documents and prisoner of war interrogation reports indicate that he was plagued by an extreme rice shortage in the Southern provinces.

(c) II Corps Tactical Zone. Activity in the II Corps Tactical Zone was highlighted by heavy ground pressure and attacks by fire on the CIDG Camp at Ben Het and the Dak To area by the 28th and 66th NVA Regiments, supported by the 40th NVA Artillery. The enemy's goal was to embarrass the United States at the Paris Peace Conference by making this a second "Dien Bien Phu." Interdiction of lines of communications was repeatedly manifested by the damage and destruction of pipelines, and ambushes and harassment of convoys, primarily along Highways 1, 14 and 19.

(d) III Corps Tactical Zone. The enemy concentrated his activities on small scale ground attacks and numerous attacks by fire along friendly lines of communications, landing zones and fire support bases. The most significant of these actions occurred on 7 June at Fire Support Base CROOK. During this action, the 88th NVA Regiment sustained 323 KIA and two PW's while US casualties were only two WIA. Attacks against merchant ships in the Long Tau shipping channel rose sharply during the quarter. The highest number of attacks occurred in the month of June.

(e) IV Corps Tactical Zone. Enemy activity in the IV Corps Tactical Zone remained at a relatively low level. Numerous reports were received

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
SFOR-65 (R1) (U)

which indicated that the enemy planned to conduct attacks on the Dong Tam, My Tho area during the redeployment of the 9th US Division. They intended to show the Vietnamese people that the US was forced to withdraw. The enemy redeployed the 273d VC Regiment into the IV CTZ in order to bolster his forces. A growing body of intelligence pointed to enemy plans to exploit the alteration of relative strengths in the corps area. The entire border of the corps from the Parrot's Beak west, was spotted with numerous agent reports indicating a greatly increased enemy presence throughout the area. During the first two weeks of July, 420 Cambodian mercenaries and 436 dissident members of the "Hu Huu Hao Regiment" rallied for unknown reasons.

(2) (C) The following special studies, projects and fact sheets were completed during this period:

May	Intelligence Annex to USARV OPLAN 1-69 revised.
May - June	History of the 95C NVA Regiment, 1st NVA Division compiled and published.
June	Special study concerning enemy anti-tank mining compiled and furnished US 1st Infantry Division.
June - July	History of 88th NVA Regiment, 9th VC Division compiled and published.

(3) (U) The Monthly Intelligence Review (MIR) continued to provide the intelligence community with a comprehensive and detailed review of country-wide enemy activity and associated items of special interest.

(4) (U) A monthly intelligence briefing was conducted for all newly arrived and assigned officers and senior non-commissioned officers assigned to Headquarters USARV. In addition, special intelligence briefings were given for visiting dignitaries as required.

(5) (U) On Friday of each week an intelligence conference was held for representatives of the local intelligence community and the USARV staff. The agenda of the conference included summaries of significant operations, enemy activities and changes in the enemy order of battle. Weekly Intelligence Conference Notes were provided to all attendees.

11
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(6) (U) The Current Analysis Special Intelligence (CASI) Branch provided material to support an all-source intelligence review. This review was presented to the command group daily and to other groups and agencies as required.

(7) (C) The April 1969 command survey on the tactical operational value of the OV-1B (SLAR) and OV-1C (IR) Mohawk was approved on 4 June 1969.

(a) Summary of pertinent points made by the commanders during the survey were:

1 SLAR and IR represent the only capabilities for surveillance of large areas during hours of darkness. They provide on a daily basis indications of enemy activity not obtainable by any other means.

2 IR is a reliable and effective collection resource. It plays a key role in confirming or refuting other intelligence information and contributes directly to the intelligence data base upon which daily combat decisions are made. Reducing the assets currently available would seriously degrade the intelligence collection effort and adversely effect operational planning, including the targeting program.

3 SLAR appears to have proved more effective when employed out-of-country. In-country SLAR is more effective in the delta areas where near ideal environmental conditions for its employment exist. It is marginally effective, at best, elsewhere. Reducing in-country SLAR assets would not markedly degrade either the intelligence collection effort or operational planning.

(b) On 5 June 1969, the study was forwarded to COMUSMACV, with the following recommendations:

1 That MACV and USARV jointly review the total SLAR requirements with a view toward reducing and realigning the OV-1B (SLAR) assets currently in the USARV inventory.

2 That the fifty-four OV-1C (IR) aircraft presently on hand be retained.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(8) (U) The USARV 5th Weather Squadron Chief Observer's Workshop was held at the Vung Tau Army Installation on 26 and 27 June 1969. In attendance were the Chief Observers of HQ USARV, I FFORCEV, II FFORCEV, subordinate Army division weather stations, and fixed Army resupply airfields. The purpose of the conference was to discuss supply support difficulties, maintenance programs and reports, manning and manpower, weather communications, observing technical effectiveness programs, and to define the operational goals of standardizing training and management programs.

(9) (U) In accordance with the continuing effort to improve the dissemination and exchange of intelligence information and techniques throughout the Republic of Vietnam, the fourth quarterly issue of USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons was published and distributed on 1 July 1969.

d. (C) PLANS, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

(1) (C) The movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) Rear Elements from An Khe to Bien Hoa.

The movement of men and equipment, initiated on 1 April 1969 was completed on 6 May 1969. Range facilities were constructed, and power, water and sanitation facilities were upgraded to accommodate the increased population density at Bien Hoa.

(2) (C) The Redeployment of US Army Units from RVN to CONUS and Hawaii.

(a) On 8 June 1969, the President of the United States announced the redeployment of 25,000 US forces from RVN. The Army's increment included 14,376 personnel assigned to 52 units. Each of these units was given from 15 to 30 days stand down time to prepare for redeployment. Of the 29 units attached or organic to the 9th Infantry Division, nine redeployed to CONUS for deactivation and one redeployed to Hawaii as of 31 July 1969. One of the two national guard units redeployed to CONUS for demobilization. During August, the remainder of the 9th Infantry Division's units scheduled for redeployment; three active Army units not related to the 9th Infantry Division; the second national guard unit; and the 18 reserve units will redeploy. The six aerial ports used for

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

redeployment were: Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, Phu Cat, Tan Son Nhut, Chu Lai, and Bien Hoa. The seaport of Newport at Saigon will be used to redeploy the seatail of the 9th Infantry Division to Hawaii.

(b) Highlights of redeployment activities from the date of the President's announcement on 8 June through 31 July follow:

1 11 June 1969: MACV issued OPLAN 182-69 for the redeployment of 25,000 US troops from RVN.

2 12-14 June 1969: A CINCPAC redeployment conference was held with the following results:

a Redeployment would start during the period 1-15 July 1969. Some advance parties would be permitted to redeploy prior to this time.

b The redeployment would be completed prior to 31 August 1969.

c Approximately 8,000 Army troops would be returned to CONUS. Units involved would be inactivated or demobilized.

d Approximately 7,000 Army troops would move to Hawaii.

e Approximately 8,000 Marines would be redeployed to Okinawa and 400 to Japan.

f Approximately 1,200 Navy personnel would redeploy to PACFLT and CONUS.

g The forces redeployed by 31 August would total approximately 25,000 personnel.

The Army units designated for redeployment were:

9th INFANTRY DIVISION UNITS

3/60th Inf Bn

4/47 Inf Bn

65th Inf Plt (CT)

18th PI Det

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

22d PI Det	3/47th Inf Bn
3/34th Arty Bn	4/39th Inf Bn
3/39th Inf Bn	HHC 1st Bde
1/84th Arty Bn	9th Avn Bn
9th MI Det	9th Med Bn
9th Sig Bn	709th CS Bn (Maint)
15th Engr Bn (CBT)	9th AG Co
HHC 9th Inf Div	Co E, 75th Inf
9th MP Co	HHC 2d Bde
1097th TC Co (Med bt)	2/39th Inf Bn
1/11th Arty Bn	584th MI Det
HHC Div Arty	9th CS Bn (S&T)
Hq and Band, Spt Cmd	

ARMY RESERVE UNITS

452nd CS Co (S&S)	313th Med Det
889th Med Det	630th TC Co (Med Trk)
378th Med Det	305th Med Det
1011th CS Co (S&S)	319th TC Co (Lt Trk)
173d QM Co (POL)	950th AG PO (Type U)
311th Med Hosp (FLD)	737th TC (Med Trk)

15
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

978th AG PO (Type U)

312th Med Hosp (Evac)

472d Med Det

316th Med Det

HHC 336th ORD Bn (Ammo)

74th Med Hosp (FLD)

NATIONAL GUARD UNITS

650th Med Det (Dental Svc)

126th CS Co (S&S)

OTHER REGULAR ARMY UNITS

70th Engr Co (Dump Trk)

86th Engr Bn (CBT)

6/56th Arty Bn (ADA)

3 16 June 1969: USARPAC concurred with a DA draft LOI for the redeployment of US Army forces from RVN.

4 19 June 1969: USARV representatives attended a meeting of the Joint Transportation Board in Hawaii. The CINCPAC Movement Program 1 July - 31 August 1969 was completed.

5 21 June 1969: USARPAC published its LOI for redeployment.

6 21 June 1969: The USARV Redeployment Control Center (URCC) was established and operational.

7 22 June 1969: USARV submitted recommended movement dates for redeploying units to MACV.

8 23 June 1969: The USARV Planning and Operations Group (UPOG) was established at Dong Tam, RVN. Its purpose was to provide operational guidance and assistance to the CG 9th Infantry Division during redeployment. The UPOG consisted of USARV staff representatives from G3, G4, AVN, ENGR, and AG plus selected personnel of the 1st Logistical Command. The UPOG was stationed at Dong Tam on a full time basis. The group chief was authorized to report directly to the Chief of Staff, USARV.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

9 24 June 1969: Advanced Movement Directive for 3/60th Inf Bn, the Seattle parade battalion, was received.

10 27 June 1969: USARV OPORD 182-69 was published and distributed.

11 27 June 1969: USARV requested approval of stand-down dates for redeploying units.

12 28 June 1969: The Advanced Movement Directive 4-69 was received from USARPAC.

13 2 July 1969: Redeployment of US Army forces from RVN began with the departure of the 3/60th Infantry Battalion's 12-man advance party.

14 8 July 1969: The movement program was modified as requested by the Commanding General, 9th Infantry Division by reducing the peak deployment periods and spreading departures over a longer period of time.

15 12 July 1969: The USARV Redeployment Assistance Team (URAT) was established. This mobile contact team proved valuable in assisting small, isolated units in their redeployment activities.

(c) The following list reflects units redeployed, destination and date of redeployment through 31 July 1969. A total of 4,260 Army personnel were deployed during the reporting period.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DESTINATION</u>	<u>DATE OF REDEPLOYMENT</u>
3/60th Inf Bn	CONUS	8 July 1969
4/47 Inf Bn	CONUS	13 July 1969
3/47th Inf Bn (-)	CONUS	15 July 1969
650th Med Det (Dental Svc)	CONUS	15 July 1969
65th Inf Plt (CT) (-)	CONUS	15 July 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

9th Inf Div (Adv Party)	Hawaii	15 July 1969
3/47th Inf Bn (Final Elements)	CONUS	18 July 1969
22d PI Det	CONUS	18 July 1969
65th Inf Plt (CT) (Final Elements)	CONUS	18 July 1969
HHC, 2d Bde	CONUS	18 July 1969
18th PI Det	CONUS	20 July 1969
1097th TC Co (Med Bt)	CONUS	26 July 1969
3/34th Arty Bn	CONUS	26 July 1969
4/39th Inf Bn	Hawaii	30 July 1969

(3) (C) The Deployment of the M551 Sheridan. The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) completed a 90-day operational evaluation of the Sheridan on 8 May 1969. The ACTIV evaluation was forwarded to USARV for indorsement. To assess the acceptability of the Sheridan in Vietnam, USARV analyzed the ACTIV report, the terrain, the enemy situation, the operational requirements of units scheduled to receive the Sheridan, the capabilities and limitations of the M551 compared to the vehicles it would replace, and the considered opinion of commanders scheduled to receive the Sheridan. The results of this assessment were that USARV would accept 171 TOE Sheridans for deployment to RVN during calendar year 1969, provided eleven essential modifications were applied to all future Sheridans prior to their issue to using units. On 26 May, DA was informed of the USARV position and an in-country priority of issue schedule was developed. On 24 July, DA notified USARV that a total of 252 TOE Sheridans would be deployed to RVN during the period 31 July 1969 to 31 March 1970.

(4) (U) Organization of the 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Concurrent with redeployment, the 9th Infantry Division was directed to reorganize the 3d Brigade and to continue tactical operations. The brigade

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

was organized on an austere basis, based on the 199th LIB structure, with maximum support being provided by 1st Logistical Command units. Effective 20 July 1969, the brigade was provisionally organized as a separate infantry brigade.

(5) (U) Reorganization of Americal Division. Reorganization of the Americal Division which began in December 1968 is now completed. Phase II, the actual reorganization, began on 15 February 1969 and ended in March 1969. Phase III, the final review and adjustment phase was completed in May 1969.

(6) (U) Documentation for Phase III. Standardization (USARV COSTAR UNITS) was completed and submitted during the period of May 1968 through February 1969. General Order implementation of Phase III began in May 1969. To date, General Orders have been received for approximately 25 percent of the Phase III units.

(7) (U) Base Camp TDA/USARV MTDA. Augmentation TDA's for separate brigades were submitted in May 1969 which contain minimum essential equipment, not provided by TOE/MTOE, for base camp operations. Augmentation TDA's for the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), 23d Infantry Division, and the 25th Infantry Division were submitted in July 1969 and the remaining two division's base camp TDA's will be submitted in August 1969. The USARV MTDA was updated and submitted to USARPAC in May 1969. USARPAC approved the MTDA and forwarded it to DA in June 1969.

(8) (U) 1st Logistical Command TDA. In accordance with guidance received from DA, a closed loop package of TDA/MTDA reorganizing the 1st Logistical Command, and the Support Commands at Qui Nhon, Saigon, and Cam Ranh Bay was submitted in May 1969. The package implemented USARPAC Manpower Utilization Surveys, Program 6 Civilianization and current Local National Augmentation of TOE units.

(9) (U) Quick Reaction Lessons Learned. The analysis of tactical actions continued through the medium of Combat Lessons Bulletins and Training Newsletters. Nine Combat Lessons Bulletins and one Training Newsletter were published and disseminated during the reporting period.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

These were:

- (a) A SERGEANT MAJOR'S COMBAT TIPS
- (b) SMALL UNIT HASTY DEFENSES
- (c) ATTACK ON A NIGHT DEFENSIVE POSITION
- (d) DEFENSE OF PATROL BASE FRONTIER CITY
- (e) COUNTER MINE AND BOOBY TRAP PROGRAM
- (f) AMBUSH OF A SUPPLY CONVOY
- (g) CONVOY SECURITY
- (h) FIRE SUPPORT BASE CROOK
- (i) COMPUTERIZATION OF DATA FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING
- (10) (C) ENSURE Program. During the period, 10 ENSURE requests were submitted to DA for new or improved equipment. Significant ENSURE actions during the periods were:
 - (a) The requirement for Air Cushion Vehicles (ACV) was reviewed following the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division. The requirement for six additional ACV's was subsequently reduced to three and finally cancelled completely by DA. The one platoon of three ACV's in RVN is assigned to II FFORCEV.
 - (b) Operational quantities of the tank mounted mine clearing roller (twenty-one) were requested under ENSURE procedure following a successful evaluation.
 - (c) The multi-shot flame weapon, XM191, arrived in RVN with a New Equipment Training Team. On the first day of training, a malfunction in the trigger mechanism occurred, resulting in the accidental

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

firing of the weapon. All weapons have since been returned to CONUS for modification. The initial delivery of weapons is scheduled to begin in mid-September 1969 after safety modifications have been applied.

(11) (C) ENSURE Requests. The following is a summary of ENSURE requests submitted during the period 1 May - 31 July 1969:

(a) M-48 Tank Mounted Mine Clearing Roller (ENSURE 202 Add-on) - validated.

(b) Groundfire Detector for the AH-1G - Pending DA validation.

(c) Burst Control Selector for the M-16 - validated.

(d) Heavy Duty High Pressure Cleaning Equipment - validated.

(e) Meteorological Balloons - Pending DA validation.

(f) Mortar Locator Radar Simulator - cancelled by DA. Being processed as Electronic Warfare Quick Reaction Development.

(g) Trajectory Safe Fuze, XM577 - Not validated by DA. Is being developed under normal R&D.

(h) Lightweight Secure Tactical Communication System - Pending DA validation.

(i) Spade Plow - Pending DA validation.

(j) 2.75 TEA filled Rocket (flame weapon) - Pending DA validation.

e. (C) LOGISTICS.

(1) (C) Ammunition Supply.

(a) Seven ammunition items were under Available Supply Rate (ASR)/Allocation management at the end of July as compared to eight at the end of April. Items under ASR/Allocation management at the close of the period were:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

*Ctg, 40mm HE

*Rkt 2.75" HE Hv PD

*Gren, Hd. Off

*Sig Illum, WSC

*Rkt 2.75" HE, Lt, PD

*Sig Illum, WSP

*Rkt 2.75" Flechette

*Items under DA ASR management

NOTE: Former MACV allocation management items are now under USARV allocation management. The authority for the allocation of these items has been passed from MACV to USARV. All of the former MACV ASR management items were under the USARV allocation at the end of July 1969.

(b) Cycle III of the Class V inventory was completed in May 1969. Net Inventory Adjustment was + .017%, indicating the necessity for and the value of a continuing cyclic Class V inventory program.

(c) Phase III of the USARV Class V Retrograde Program was completed on 30 June 1969. This program initiated on 1 March 1969 had a goal of 10,000 short tons (ST) to be retrograded by 30 June 1969. The goal was exceeded by 3,997 ST.

(d) Class V receipts in June exceeded issues for the first time since October 1968, when 104,423 ST were delivered vs 78,143 ST issued.

The high receipts represent delivery of additional tonnage to compensate for combat losses and issues in excess of the Theater Sustaining Rate (TSR) during the Post Tet Offensive in February and March 1969.

(2) (C) M551 Sheridan Deployment

(a) The M551 Sheridan was deployed to RVN in early January 1969. Two units, the 1st Squadron, 11th ACR and the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 25th Infantry Division were selected to receive the initial shipment of Sheridans. Each squadron is authorized 27 TOE vehicles and each of the two maintenance support units have three maintenance float vehicles.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

The eleven modifications recommended as a result of operational tests will be made in CONUS or in RVN during deprocessing. All modifications will be applied to the M551 Seridans prior to their issue to using units.

(b) During the remainder of calendar year 1969, 171 TOE and 19 Maintenance Float vehicles will be deployed to RVN. Additional combat loss replacement vehicles are programmed to arrive each month. The programmed loss rate is 6 percent of TOE density per month. A 26-man New Equipment Training Team (NETT) and a 15-man modification team arrived in-country on 26 July. The modification team will install the remaining modifications at the Long Binh Depot.

(c) The 3d Squadron, 11th ACR is scheduled to receive 27 TOE Sheridans on 5 August 1969. Three additional maintenance float Sheridans will go to the 185th Maintenance Battalion. Twelve of these 30 M551's arrived in-country on 23 July 1969, aboard the USS BURBANK VICTORY. The remaining 18 vehicles arrived aboard the USS MAYO LYKES on 24 July 1969.

(3) (U) Services Activities

(a) Cargo discharged and handled in RVN ports (ST):

	<u>Discharged</u>	<u>Handled</u>
April	434,729	667,053
May	490,929	718,001
June	539,791	743,228

(b) Sea Land Container Service

	<u>Dry Vans</u>	<u>Reefer Vans</u>	<u>Total</u>
April	1,551	326	1,877
May	1,075	238	1,313
June	1,608	358	1,966

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) Motor Transport Tonnage (ST):

	<u>Port and Beach</u>	<u>Local</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Total</u>
April	300,665	336,728	140,064	777,457
May	284,941	287,457	120,774	693,172
June	326,705	290,708	136,012	753,425

(d) Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) Service from Okinawa (Semi-trailers and vans):

April	280
May	370
June	193

(e) Rail Tonnage (ST):

April	36,605
May	45,162.9
June	51,275.4

(f) Air Passenger Movements (Out of Country):

	<u>Programmed</u>	<u>Allocated</u>	<u>Actually Moved</u>	<u>% Used</u>
April	32,538	29,858	29,759	99.7%
May	32,040	31,431	32,182	102.4%*
June	29,974	28,786	29,531	102.7%*

*Unused aircraft allocated to other services were obtained which caused the number of passengers moved to exceed the spaces allocated.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(g) Intra-RVN Cargo/Passenger Movements:

	<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Passengers</u>
April	48,050	169,324
May	48,173	167,998
June	39,994	161,061

(h) Emergency Airlift Shipments:

	<u>Tactical Emergency</u>	<u>Emergency Resupply</u>	<u>Combat Essential</u>	<u>Total</u>
April	2	5	60	67
May	2	4	55	61
June	0	5	33	38

(4) (U) Graves Registration Operations. Summary of mortuary operations is as follows:

(a) Remains processed:

	<u>USA Mortuary, TSN</u>	<u>USA Mortuary, DNG</u>	<u>Total</u>
April	580	469	1049
May	757	755	1512
June	675	643	1318

(b) Personal Property Division Status:

Cases received 1 Apr - 30 Jun 69	-2823
Cases shipped 1 Apr - 30 Jun 69	-2670
Cases on hand 30 Jun 69	- 948

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(5) (U) Class III Supply and Distribution. Consumption of bulk petroleum by US Forces, FWMAF, and RVNAF in II, III, and IV CTZ during the quarter was as follows:

April	2, 815, 000 Bbl
May	2, 679, 400 Bbl
June	2, 750, 300 Bbl

f. (U) COMMAND MANAGEMENT. None.

g. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(1) During the period, 268 complaints and 2,176 requests for assistance were processed. Of the 268 complaints, 87 were justified. This represented a slight increase in complaints and requests for assistance compared with the previous period. The largest group of complaints concerned unit administration to include job dissatisfaction, disciplinary matters, harassment and the administration of leaves and passes. There was no indication of problem areas which could have resulted in conditions detrimental to the efficiency or reputation of the command.

(2) Headquarters USARV conducted Annual General Inspections of 41 USARV organizations during this period. Areas most often found to be unsatisfactory or deficient were: lack of emphasis on the collection of partial, advance, and casual payments previously made to personnel; failure to establish pin-point distribution accounts with the appropriate AG Publications Centers; ineffective or non-existent censorship contingency planning, to include appointment of censorship officers; misuse of supply issue priority designators 05 and higher, and the erroneous authentication of high priority supply requisitions by other than the unit commander or executive officer; ineffective implementation of maintenance management procedures, including The Army Equipment Records System (TAERS), maintenance of prescribed load lists (PLL) of repair parts, and stock records; poor maintenance of tactical and support vehicles, due primarily to inattention or negligence of the driver and a lack of supervision or proper emphasis by commanders

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

and maintenance personnel at all levels; failure to conduct required inventories of arms and ammunition; failure to record individual weapon serial numbers on organizational clothing and equipment records; and unauthorized alterations to tropical combat uniforms.

h. (U) COMMAND INFORMATION. None.

i. (U) CIVIL AFFAIRS.

(1) New Solatium Regulation. Following the transfer of primary staff responsibility for solatium payments from SJA to the ACoIS, G5, the USARV regulation on solatium was reviewed and updated to reflect this change. In addition, monetary guidelines were amplified, responsibilities were more clearly defined, and procedures for the preparation of finance vouchers were delineated. This was done to insure the prompt payment of solatium. To be meaningful, oriental customs dictate that timely payments be made to the family of the deceased. The new regulation will be published in August as USARV Supplement 1 to AR 27-28 and will supersede USARV Regulation 27-4.

(2) Procurement and Issue of PSYOP Equipment. A USARV survey in June 1969 determined that an immediate requirement existed to provide US Army combat units with additional items of PSYOP equipment. The equipment was required for combat operations and for the support of the GVN pacification program. A request for the purchase of 23 AFM-ABS-4 loudspeakers, 1211 An/PIQ-5A bullhorns, 44 Ampex cassette tape recorders, and 18 Polaroid cameras at a total estimated cost of \$244,950.00 was initiated. Concurrent actions were begun to establish the basis of issue and to obtain permanent authorization for this equipment by changing appropriate MTOE's and TDA's.

(3) Management Improvement of the Kit Carson Scout Program (KCS). The KCS program reflected an overall growth of 102 scouts during the reporting period. The rate of growth declined as employing units emphasized more stringent standards for recruiting. Additionally, redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division created a temporary drop in overall strength. Eighty-six of the 9th Infantry Division's KCS's elected to be released from the program when major elements of the Division redeployed. Forty-seven KCS's were transferred to other

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

USARV units from the 9th Infantry Division. Major accomplishments in the KCS program for the quarter were:

(a) Continued review of KCS personnel requirements resulted in a reallocation of spaces among USARV units within the MACV ceiling.

(b) USARV Regulation 525-9, Military Operations, Kit Carson Scout Program, was published, effective 31 July 1969.

(c) USARV Regulation 37-34, Financial Administration of Payments to Kit Carson Scouts was published, effective 8 June 1969.

(d) A KCS conference was held at Headquarters, USARV on 23 May 1969. Agenda items included a discussion of the new USARV KCS Regulation 525-9, new policies for the payment of KCS salaries under USARV Regulation 37-34, and the preparation of draft deferments and death gratuity claims.

j. (U) COMMAND HISTORY.

(1) Completed Historical Projects. Reports finalized by the Military History Detachments (MHD's) and forwarded to the office of the Chief of Military History were:

(a) A final part of a two-part report on Operation Speedy Express

(b) The Defense of Long Binh Post

(c) QL4 and A Shau Road Construction

(d) The 116th Engineer Battalion (NG)

(e) The 131st Engineer Company (LE)

(f) The Royal Thai Volunteer Force's 16 June Defense of Loc An Base Camp

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(2) Projects Initiated. An in-depth report was started on the Binh Dinh Province pacification program. This report will contain in excess of 100 recorded interviews along with numerous supporting documents. It is scheduled for completion during September 1969. Other new projects deal with redeployment, and signal training.

k. (C) Aviation.

(1) Air Operations.

(a) The Education Working Group of the Joint Air Operation Group (JAOG) presented 18 briefings in CONUS to selected Army and Air Force service schools and staff agencies. The briefings began on 16 April 1969 and were completed on 12 May 1969. The subjects covered by the briefing team included air traffic control, airfield operations and airfield maintenance. Upon their return to RVN, the briefing team presented 23 briefings between 23 June and 26 July to units in the four CTZ's of Vietnam.

(b) The second quarterly meeting of the JAOG was held on 8 July 1969. As a result of this meeting the following items were scheduled for revision:

1 The Artillery Warning Directive (MACV Dir 95-12) will be changed to include airstrike warnings.

2 The Tactical Aerodrome Directory listings will be changed to include artillery and airstrike warnings.

3 C-7, C-123, and C-130 Airfield Standards and Criteria (MACV Dir 415-9) will be revised to include the requirement for wind socks and OV-10 construction data.

(c) The OV-1 evaluation report on the consolidation of the 1st Cavalry Division's (Airmobile) and 1st Infantry Division's Aerial Surveillance Target Acquisition (ASTA) Platoons with the 73d Surveillance Aircraft Company (SAC) has been completed. The recommendations were as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

- 1 That platoons remain attached to the 73d SAC.
- 2 That OV-1 direct support concept of employment be extended to all CTZ's where US Divisions are deployed.
- 3 That the 101st Airborne Division's (Airmobile) requirement for an ASTA platoon be cancelled.

(2) Aircraft Logistics.

(a) USARV is currently authorized 79 UH-1B/C helicopters for command and control. The UH-1H is the preferred aircraft for this mission. This headquarters has forwarded a request to USARPAC for a change in the MTOE's from AH-1B to UH-1D/H helicopters.

(b) The use and interchangeability of MIL-L-23699 and MIL-L-7808 oils in Army turbine aircraft was clarified by USAAVSCOM, resulting in definitive instructions being issued to the field by this headquarters. Scattered reports received from units indicated that oil leakage and power loss problems were experienced as a result of the directed change. These were isolated occurrences and were not considered significant. The conversion directive remains in effect.

(3) Avionics.

(a) The first Selected Lightweight Avionic Equipment (SLAE) equipped LOH-6 aircraft arrived in RVN on 20 June 1969. To date, there are 60 SLAE equipped LOH aircraft in USARV. The SLAE VRC-116 (UHF) set has been replaced by a "piggy back" ARC-151. Problems have been encountered with the VRC-114 FM set, however, DS unit have been able to cope with the failures. The main cause for failure was attributed to the accumulation of rain water in the radios, which occurred in aircraft parked with the doors removed.

(b) Twenty-five additional AN/ASC-15 command and control consoles are programmed for USARV during the first quarter FY 70. This will increase the in-country assets of AN/ASC-15 consoles to 108. The remaining requirements for 133 consoles will be filled by AN/ASC-10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

and AN/ASC-15 consoles. After the issue of the twenty-five AN/ASC-15 consoles, a mixture of twenty-five AN/ASC-10 and AN/ASC-11 consoles will be retrograded to CONUS for repair and return to stock. Once in stock, these consoles will be applied against USARPAC requirements for the USARV float and operational use in Korea.

(c) The first shipment of 120 emergency survival radios, AN/URC-68, scheduled for USARV, arrived in June 1969. A total of 3800 of these radios are scheduled for delivery to this command. There is a critical shortage of these radios due to the slow delivery rate. To alleviate this problem, 2000 RT-10 radios will be shipped to USARV in September 1969. ECOM representatives at the Worldwide Avionics Conference 3-6 June 1969 made arrangements for these additional radios to be purchased from the Air Force, rebuilt and shipped to USARV. The delivery of the AN/URC-68 radios is over one year behind schedule due to engineering problems.

(d) The majority of the parts ordered for the in-country fabrication of 40 OH-6A command consoles arrived in USARV on 24 July 1969. Fabrication is expected to begin in August. The work will be accomplished by the Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility, Vung Tau. These consoles will be wired to provide one channel of secure voice (FM) and two channels of FM without secure voice. The estimated delivery date of the 40 LOH consoles is 30 September 1969.

(4) Aircraft Armament.

(a) The conversion of the AH-1G armament subsystem from the TAT-102 (Minigun) to the XM-28 (Minigun and 40mm grenade launcher) is in the last stage of completion. Eighty-six subsystems were converted by the Lockheed contract team. The last conversion is scheduled for completion by 14 August 1969.

(b) The distribution of the Mission Support Plan for the XM-35 armament subsystem (20mm, 6-barrel gun for the AH-1G) has been completed and submitted for the 2d Quarter, FY 70. The Mission Support Plan for the 3d and 4th Quarters, FY 70, will be submitted at the Worldwide Aviation Closed Loop Support Conference in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

September 1969. The initial deployment of the XM-35 armament subsystem has been changed from September 1969 to March 1970.

(c) The XM-3 (40mm grenade launcher for the OH-6A) arrived in April 1969. A 90-day evaluation was conducted by ACTIV, and was concluded on 29 July 1969. Results indicate that this is an acceptable weapon. A recommended basis for issue is currently being formulated.

(5) Aviation Training.

(a) The AH-1G Training Team continued operations during the reporting period with 67 aviators completing transition training and 22 aviators completing instructor pilot or standardization instructor pilot (IP/SIP) qualification in the AH-1G helicopter. Additionally, 16 aviators were qualified as IP/SIP's during non-school training time.

(b) The OH-6A Training Team transitioned 16 aviators qualified 26 aviators as IP/SIP's in the OH-6A helicopter during the reporting period. Five additional aviators were qualified as IP/SIP's during non-school time. To meet changing requirements and to provide subordinate units with sufficient OH-6A instructor personnel for local transitions, the OH-6A Training Team concentrated only on IP/SIP qualification training after 1 June 1969.

(c) The T-55-L-II Engine NETT arrived in RVN during April 1969, and started the first class on 12 May 1969. Twenty-two personnel have completed training as of 31 July 1969. This engine will be installed in CH-47(-) and new CH-47C helicopters, one of which arrived in-country in July 1969.

(d) The Army Aviation Refresher Training School (AARTS) continued to operate at maximum capacity. The only change in POI was the addition of an aircraft technical inspection course.

1. (C) ENGINEER.

(1) (C) Operations.

(a) The 299th Engineer Battalion (Combat) and the 15th Engineer

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Company (LE) moved from Dak To to Phu Tai to provide combat engineer support in the vicinity of Qui Nhon and An Khe.

(b) The 595th Engineer Company (LE) moved from the vicinity of My Tho to Dong Ba Thin to provide engineer equipment support for projects in the Cam Ranh Bay area.

(c) The 511th Engineer Company (PB) moved from Chu Lai to Phu Bai to provide panel bridge support for the U. S. Army ground combat forces in Northern I CTZ.

(d) Redeployment operations involved, from the engineer aspect, movement of the 86th Engineer Battalion (Combat), the 70th Engineer Company (DT), and the development of a plan for the disposition of Dong Tam facilities.

1 Redeployment of the 70th Engineer Company (DT) posed few problems because the unit was at zero strength in personnel and equipment when designated as a redeploying unit. The unit was brought to TOE strength by filler personnel for redeployment to CONUS.

2 The 86th Engineer Battalion (Combat) redeployed with the following personnel status: Seventeen percent of the redeployment strength consisted of assigned members of battalion; forty-nine percent were 20th Engineer Brigade fillers; thirty-four percent were fillers from other USARV units. The majority of the battalion's equipment was redistributed to 20th Engineer Brigade units.

3 The disposition of Dong Tam facilities was decided by a committee chaired by a representative of USARV. Other representatives were from DMAC, 9th Infantry Division, ARVN 7th Division and ARVN 4th ALC.

(2) (U) Construction.

(a) The USARV Fiscal Year 1971 Military Construction Program was submitted to MACV and USARPAC in May 1969. MACV supported a program of \$168.4 million and USARPAC unofficially supported a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

program of \$154.4 million. Withdrawal of elements of the 9th Infantry Division from RVN resulted in considerable reprogramming action and made available funds for other urgently needed projects.

(b) An automatic data processing system is being used as an aid to the management of the MCA construction program. Pertinent information about each project is punched on a punch card. The program is restricted to sorting in five functional sequences. The results are printed each month or more frequently if required. These sorts and a few of their uses are:

- 1 USARV project numb - for reference to files.
- 2 line item identifier - for funding actions.
- 3 contractor project number - for contractor coordination.
- 4 major command user - for customer reference.
- 5 location - for priority meetings, construction site visits and base development actions.

(3) (U) Mapping and Intelligence.

(a) Since the last report there has been very little progress on the First Order Traverse. The lack of progress was due to a combination of problems; the shift into the Delta of the monsoon season, enemy activity, and the lack of operational distance measuring equipment. Friendly forces destroyed several survey monuments primarily in the I CTZ. Additional work, duplicative in nature, was required to reestablish these points. Because the specifications for the First Order Survey call for night observation, security was a continuing problem. On 19 June a party working in I CTZ was hit by an indirect fire attack. Several pieces of equipment were destroyed and two surveyors were wounded. This project was temporarily halted until replacement equipment could be acquired.

(b) Two new projects were begun and a great deal of progress made on existing programs. The two new projects are large scale

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

**SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR -65 (R1) (U)**

city maps of the Long Binh Post complex and the Cam Ranh Bay area. Both are scheduled for completion during FY 70; Long Binh in the early part of the second quarter and Cam Ranh in the latter part of the fourth quarter.

(c) Aerial photography has been directed both toward the LOC program and mapping requirements. The weather pattern will allow an increasing number of flights in the I and II CTZ regions during the coming quarter while the Delta will continue to be obscured by clouds until the early part of November.

(d) Tactical scale terrain studies and hamlet studies were produced for the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, at the rate of one tactical scale terrain study per quarter.

(e) Engineer Terrain Intelligence activities were decreased in the Delta (with the exception of hydrographic surveys) and increased in the I CTZ. Activities included road reconnaissance and layout for the XXIV Corps, operation of the soils laboratory at Long Binh in conjunction with USAECAV, and an investigation of long-term canal projects in the Saigon area.

(f) One significant change in the mapping and intelligence mode of operation was the initiation of a country-wide briefing program. This was conducted to acquaint field users with the support available for mapping and terrain intelligence. Although the program is new, it is apparent that the results will justify the additional effort. The program will be conducted every six to eight months with the briefings being held down to separate brigade and battalion level.

(4) (U) Supply. As of 30 June 1969, 443 pieces of commercial construction equipment have been received in RVN under the Military Construction Army-Lines of Communication (MCA-LOC) Program. This figure represents 68 percent of the total items purchased. Items still due include the following: Dump Truck - 206 each, Rock Crusher - 5 each, and Transit Mixer - 15 each.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

m. (C) COMMUNICATIONS/ELECTRONICS.

(1) (C) Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM)

During the reporting period, the three remaining secure voice switchboards (SECORD/s) were activated bringing the total of active SECORD's to thirteen. The Nha Trang SECORD became operational on 7 July 1969, Pleiku on 9 July 1969, and Qui Nhon on 25 July 1969. This completed Phase I of the SECORD installation and activations. At the close of the reporting period, 179 wideband and 22 narrowband subscribers, of all services, have been activated. Of these, 106 wideband and 10 narrowband terminals are the maintenance responsibility of the U. S. Army.

(2) (C) Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN). Significant improvement of USARV AUTODIN is dependent upon the availability of Digital Subscribers Terminal Equipment (DSTE) or commercial equivalents. The delivery dates of the DSTE's have slipped from June to October 1969. In order to improve the AUTODIN service, pending the implementation of DSTE, several high speed terminals were relocated. This was necessary to meet the high volume and card requirements at Nha Trang, Pleiku, and Dong Tam Army Communication Centers. The Nha Trang Non-Automatic Relay Center was phased out when its remaining customers were provided service from active AUTODIN terminals in their area.

(3) (U) Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System Status. At the beginning of the quarterly reporting period, four Tandem Switching Centers (TSC's) were active in the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS). These TSC's were Bang Pla, Thailand; Can Tho, Vietnam; Korat, Thailand; and Nha Trang, Vietnam. On 30 June 1969, the third TSC in RVN was activated at Tan Son Nhut which provided direct dialing to subscribers of dial exchanges in the III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). The fourth TSC in RVN was activated at Nha Trang on 7 July 1969, two weeks ahead of schedule. This TSC provided long distance dialing service to subscribers in a portion of the II CTZ. The remainder of II CTZ will be provided with service when the Vung Chua Mountain TSC is activated in November 1969 and the Pleiku TSC in December 1969.

(4) (U) Subscribers' Education for the Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang Tandem Switching Center Activations. The activation of the tandem switches at Tan Son Nhut and Nha Trang, required the widest possible

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

subscriber education. The Military Assistance Command, Office of Information, provided the overall guidance for the program. The mass media were utilized to the fullest extent to present the problems and the action required by the subscribers. USARV prepared a presentation on the "INSIGHT" TV program, published notices in daily bulletins, and prepared fliers containing special messages on telephone tips and dialing instructions. This aggressive program, initiated to educate the subscribers and limit telephone calls during the critical activation period, was successful and resulted in a greatly improved long distance system for RVN subscribers.

(5) (U) Installation and Operation of Corps Area Communications Systems in Support of the Withdrawal of the 9th Infantry Division. In early June 1969, it appeared that the 9th Infantry Division would be withdrawn from RVN either totally or in part. The existing communication system's capability was compared with the anticipated communication requirements of a redeployment operation. Based on this comparison, it was determined that additional communication channels were required between Dong Tam (Headquarters, 9th Infantry Division) and Long Binh (Headquarters, USARV). The 1st Signal Brigade was tasked to install a twenty-four channel troposcatter radio system between Dong Tam and Long Binh. This system was activated on 23 June 1969. Other communication requirements both in-country and to Hawaii were met by increasing the capacity of existing facilities.

n. (U) MILITARY JUSTICE AND LEGAL AFFAIRS. None.

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. (U) PERSONNEL. None.

b. (U) OPERATIONS:

(1) Medical Civic Action Program II (MEDCAP II).

(a) OBSERVATION: Starting in December 1968, all MEDCAP II activities were directed to receive approval from the Senior MACV

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Province Advisor, Province Chief and Province Medical Chief before providing medical treatment. Prior to this time, complaints had been received from the Ministry of Health (MOH) and USAID concerning the duplication of MEDCAP II activities. These duplications did not meet the RVN population's medical needs and contributed to poor rapport with the ministry of Health.

(b) EVALUATION: MEDCAP II statistics were reviewed to determine if this added restriction had any effect on the program. The review was conducted concurrently with on-site liaison trips during the reporting period. The survey revealed that the same number of people were being seen, however, the US military units were not duplicating the efforts of other medical agencies in the provincial area. This meant that more people were cared for medically. Relationships with USAID, MOH, and provincial authorities were improved immeasurably.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That future civic action programs be properly initiated and fully coordinated with the appropriate government agencies of the host country.

c. (U) TRAINING. None.

d. (U) INTELLIGENCE. None.

e. (U) LOGISTICS.

(1) Bulk POL Quantity Control (Temperature Corrections).

(a) OBSERVATION: The Army Audit Agency during its audit of USARV POL procedures noted that commercial oil companies were experiencing inventory gains in terminal operations, rather than losses.

(b) EVALUATION: Gains, rather than losses, were attributed to the practice of using a standard temperature (82°F) rather than the actual temperature of the product as a basis for determining the 60°F quantities. The accountability problem would be reduced if the Defense Field Supply Center (DFSC) used the actual temperature as a basis for determining volumes at 60°F in new contracts and amended standard temperature provisions in current contracts as soon as possible.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(2) "NESTOR" Secure Voice Radio Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Numerous pieces of secure voice equipment arrived in RVN without the necessary installation kits and other essential elements. Two supply channels were used; COMSEC and logistical.

(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period approximately one-third of the secure voice equipment in RVN was in use. This condition stemmed from a lack of installation kits and other necessary items. An added deterring factor was generated when equipment arrived in RVN through both COMSEC and logistical channels instead of from one source. Items required for complete installation arrived in such small quantities that little change was noted in the number of operational radios. Adequate facilities were not always available for the storage of the incomplete installation kits. The overall result was a lack of confidence by commanders in the secure voice program. Numerous tactical missions were jeopardized because of the lack of secure voice radio equipment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In the future, project managers be made responsible for the "follow through" action to insure that completed kits and other necessary items are shipped as one package, through single, predesignated supply channels.

(3) Nonstandard PSYOP Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: The procurement of nonstandard equipment for psychological operations is a temporary measure which must be followed up by action to standardize equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: In the past, many items of nonstandard PSYOP equipment have been issued to PSYOP units and combat units. This posed problems for units and the logistics system which could have been avoided by the issue of standard items of equipment. Nonstandard items cannot be added to the unit MTOE's. Repair parts and maintenance support for nonstandard items can be provided only by using special procedures which require excessive time, resulting in high deadline rates. Non-serviceable items cannot be replaced because they are not authorized by

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

MTOE's. These problems would be alleviated if only standard items of PSYOP equipment were issued and action to standardize acceptable non-standard items was initiated.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That action be taken to standardize items of equipment determined to be suitable for psychological operations.

(4) Use of the M1 Additive Propellant Jacket When Firing Zone 3 Charges from the 177mm Self-Propelled Gun.

(a) OBSERVATION: Gun crews do not always use the M1 additive propellant jacket when firing zone 3 charges from the 175mm self-propelled gun.

(b) EVALUATION: When a fire mission is received, the gun crews strive to deliver rounds as quickly as possible and tend to neglect the step of installing the M1 jacket for zone 3 charges. This causes accelerated tube wear and results in more frequent tube changes. This is costly from more than a material standpoint because it is sometimes necessary to mount a combat operation to deliver replacement tubes to the firing sites. If the M1 additive jacket was issued as an integral part of all zone 3 charges, tube expenditures would be reduced.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the M1 additive jacket be made an integral part of the propellant charge for 175mm self-propelled artillery.

f. (U) ORGANIZATION: None.

g. (C) OTHER.

(1) (C) Deficiencies of the Army Authorizations Documents System (TAADS).

(a) OBSERVATION: There is considerable difficulty in relating force structure changes (FSC) to mission requirements under TAADS.

(b) EVALUATION: Example 1: On February 1969, a force structure change was submitted by USARV to implement Program 6 Civilianization by reducing six engineer construction battalions to Type B strength.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Necessary authorization documents were forwarded in April 1969. The remaining eight engineer construction battalions were already at Type B strength levels due to the manpower redistribution program. On 13 February 1969, MACV approved the use of military spaces accrued from the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program to increase the engineer construction battalions' strength back to Level 1 MTOE (899). This was done to offset the ineffective civilianization program and to preclude slippage in the LOC nation building program. Logically, these spaces were to be applied to those battalions most actively engaged in LOC work. Three such battalions could not be selected because previously initiated action under Program 6, Civilianization was pending. Example 2: On 1 March 1969, the U. S. Army Engineer Construction Agency, Vietnam, (USACAV) assumed responsibility for the facilities engineering mission from U. S. Army Headquarters Area Command (USAHAC) in the Saigon area, with associated manpower spaces to be transferred from USAHAC to USAECAV. In addition, USAECAV had assumed the responsibility for 17 other installations since July 1968. The USAECAV MTDA was submitted to USARV in May 1969. However, the USAHAC spaces for USAECAV could not be identified until the approved USAHAC MTDA was received from DA. The USAHAC MTDA was submitted in October 1968, approved by DA on 3 April 1969, but was not received by USARV until July 1969. The above two cases illustrate the lack of responsiveness in TAADS to user requirements generated by mission changes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the mechanics of the Army Authorization Documents System be analyzed to determine how the system can be made more responsive to the user's mission requirements.

(2) (U) Civilianization of Engineer Construction Battalions in Vietnam.

(a) OBSERVATION: It has become increasingly apparent that the civilianization of engineer construction battalions in Vietnam is impractical.

(b) EVALUATION: Prior to the start of the program, engineer units were already making maximum use of local nationals (LN's). Basic limitations were; available skills and the unit's ability to supervise LN's effectively. Neither of these limitations is improved by the reduction of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

military spaces, which in fact further reduces supervisory ability. LN's in time, can be trained to operate equipment such as pavers and rock crushers; and are well suited for work in prefabrication yards and for the erection of simple frame structures. However, they are not a direct substitute for the skills eliminated from the TOE's and MTOE's. They are often not available during crises, bad weather, at night or on week ends, and are not mobile. Their presence hampers the engineer unit's ability to adjust to changing work loads. The drawdown of E4's and E3's, theoretically compensated for by LN's, has left the units without basic soldiers for guard, overhead assignments and basic engineering tasks. Equipment maintenance also suffers because LN operators cannot provide the care that is expected of a soldier. Realistically, the result has been a loss of military spaces with little or nothing in return. This limits the units' capability for defense and generally degrades engineer capabilities throughout the theater.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That engineer units involved in future actions in a hostile environment not be considered for civilianization programs and that the six engineer construction battalions presently civilianized be brought back to full military strength (Level 1 MTOE).

(3) (U) Construction Program South Vietnam, Complex Review.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Complex Review is a system used to match construction assets against construction requirements as developed from MACV planning factors. This procedure is required to justify the need for a particular project. The procedure must be used with caution because deserving projects have been delayed when data was misinterpreted.

(b) EVALUATION: All facilities with the same code are lumped together, i.e., those authorized by MACV planning factors, those which are Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF), and those constructed on an "as required" basis are all added together. This results in an overstatement of assets and requests for facilities based on MACV planning factors are subsequently disapproved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Headquarters MACV consider this inequity when evaluating requests for facilities to preclude the improper disapproval of legitimate requests. This can be done by allowing increases in both the requirements and assets portions of the review or by omitting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

the assets authorized on an "as required" basis.

(4) (U) Seabee Construction Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: USARV projects constructed by Seabees in I CTZ have frequently met with delays in the initiation date and the final costs have often been in excess of Army estimates.

(b) EVALUATION:

1 The starting date delays have been attributed to the lack of designs. Project designs had to be provided by the U. S. Army because the Navy construction units do not have a design capability. Army units routinely design their own projects or use standard designs from appropriate technical manuals.

2 Construction costs for projects completed by the Third Naval Construction Brigade exceeded initial Army estimates primarily because the Navy does not operate quarries in the Da Nang and Chu Lai areas. The rock used for construction was purchased from a contractor. This created a cost increase equivalent to the cost of the rock. Army engineer units routinely obtain rock from troop operated quarries in II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That differences between Army and Navy construction procedures be identified and taken into account when preparing future cost estimates and time schedules.

h. (C) REDEPLOYMENT OPERATION "KEystone EAGLE"

(1) (C) PERSONNEL

(a) (U) Kit Carson Scouts

1 OBSERVATION: Many of the 9th Infantry Division's Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) were reluctant to accept employment with other USARV units when elements of the 9th Infantry Division redeployed.

2 EVALUATION: The reluctance of the 9th Infantry Division's KCS to accept employment with other units was largely attributed to their

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

unwillingness to move out of the local area and away from their homes. Some KCS who initially indicated they would transfer, later changed their minds. Their natural reluctance to move was overcome in some cases by using skilled KCS from other recruiting units.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That each unit employing KCS develop a positive recruiting campaign slanted toward the retention of scouts already in the program. That a liberal leave policy, to include transportation arrangements, be developed for KCS's to overcome their reluctance to leave a local area and accept employment with another unit.

(b) (U) Tour Credit.

1 OBSERVATION: Personnel required to redeploy with their unit after six months in RVN should be given credit for a complete normal foreign service tour.

2 EVALUATION: It has been found that the majority of personnel, particularly career personnel, are reluctant to redeploy without tour credit because of their vulnerability for a return assignment to RVN. During the removal of troops for the Dominican Republic in 1966-67, a precedent was established whereby individuals who spent six months in the Dominican Republic were given tour credit.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That tour completion credit be given for those individuals selected for redeployment after six months in RVN.

(c) (U) Release date for USAR and NG Units.

1 OBSERVATION: For personal planning, redeploying USAR and NG units should know their release from active duty date.

2 EVALUATION: USAR and NG personnel need to know their release from active duty date for such things as informing their employer when they will return to work and letting their dependents know when they will be home. CONARC was queried on this subject during KEYSTONE EAGLE and the approximate release date was obtained.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That the release from active duty date of

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

USAR and NG units be included in the initial letter of instruction from the Department of the Army.

(d) (U) Presentation of Awards.

1 OBSERVATION: The presentation of decorations and awards to individuals mobilized with reserve component units lacks timeliness.

2 EVALUATION: The Department of the Army established a policy for the presentation of awards and decorations to reserve component units scheduled for redeployment, and to individuals mobilized with those units. The decorations and awards were to be presented with appropriate ceremonies at home stations prior to the unit's or individual's release from active duty. This policy did not permit the timely recognition of individual acts of valor or achievement for men scheduled to be separated with their original units. Although ceremonies conducted after unit integrity has been reestablished at home station will contribute to morale and esprit, the presentation of individual awards for valor or achievement is considered more meaningful and effective when individuals are allowed to wear awards and decorations when they return to their families and friends.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That the date and location for the presentation of individual awards be left to the discretion of the unit commander.

(e) (U) Unit Redeployment Strengths.

1 OBSERVATION: Configuring units for redeployment to another overseas area is difficult because personnel are reluctant to redeploy to another overseas area without tour completion credit in RVN.

2 EVALUATION: Personnel assigned to redeploying units who have tour completion credit (10 months in RVN) cannot redeploy to another overseas area unless they volunteer to begin a new tour upon their arrival at the new duty station. DA and USARPAC letters of instruction allow personnel to volunteer to remain in RVN. Many individuals exercised this option in order to receive tour credit or to qualify for the extended early release program. Approximately one-sixth of a unit's personnel (those serving in their 11th or 12th month) have tour

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

completion credit when a redeployment date is announced. Another one-twelfth to one-sixth of the personnel complete ten months in-country before the unit redeploys, depending upon the sequence of the unit in the redeployment schedule. As a result, approximately one quarter to one-third of the personnel assigned to a unit on the date of the announcement are not eligible to redeploy to another overseas area. Filling the 9th Infantry Division's units for redeployment to Hawaii resulted in excessive personnel turbulence and required that personnel be assigned involuntarily to meet the redeployment strength. Assigning personnel from other USARV units would have increased personnel turbulence and disrupted units performing missions in a combat environment.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That units redeploy as configured on the date of the announcement minus those personnel who do not meet the redeployment criteria. Units remaining in the force structure would be filled to the authorized manning level after their arrival at the new duty station. USAR and NG units would be exempt from this policy.

(f) (C) Local National Labor Requirements.

1 OBSERVATION: When units redeploy, the requirement for Local National Direct Hire (LNDH) and Daily Hire Labor (AIK Fund) change.

2 EVALUATION: The 1st Logistical Command elements co-located with redeploying units experienced an increased workload during KEYSTONE EAGLE. Daily Hire Labor was increased to assist in the cleaning and preservation of equipment. This is not normally considered to be a proper use for Daily Hire Labor but allowances were made because of the speed of redeployment. Immediately after the redeployment there was a reduction of labor requirements which dictated a reduction of the work force population. At the same time the retention of skilled employees required by remaining units had to be assured. Situations of this nature must be handled carefully and properly to preclude any misunderstanding with the labor force and to insure adequate support for the remaining units.

3 RECOMMENDATION: Upon redeployment notification an on-site review of labor requirements of all units in the affected area must be conducted by Headquarters, USARV to determine:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

- a The temporary increase in labor requirements.
- b The labor requirements for units remaining after redeployment.
- c The requirements for Daily Hire Labor.

(2) (C) OPERATIONS.

(a) Redeployment Planning and Directives.

1 OBSERVATION: The lack of adequate time restricted orderly planning by redeploying units and delayed the issuance of directives.

2 EVALUATION: The 9th Infantry Division did not have sufficient time to execute sequential planning. Because of time restraints the Division, prior to the receipt of guidance, was forced to determine the organization of units remaining in RVN, redeploying to CONUS and redeploying to Hawaii. The time schedule below discloses that the Division found it necessary to publish implementing instructions without reference directives from USARV. This later caused minor contradictions in guidance to subordinate units.

12 June 1969	9th Inf Div Notified of Redeployment
22 June 1969	9th Inf Div Administrative Order 1-69 published
27 June 1969	USARV OPORD 182-69 published
3 July 1969	9th Inf Div OPORD 1-69 published
8 July 1969	3/60 Inf Bn Scheduled to Redeploy

The situation was further complicated by fluctuating personnel criteria for redeployment and the requirement to reorganize the 3d Brigade as a separate brigade to remain in Vietnam.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That time for sequential planning by subordinate units be provided for when directives are issued by higher

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

headquarters commensurate with security requirements and the size of the unit scheduled for redeployment.

(b) Procedural Guidance.

1 OBSERVATION: Redeploying units have difficulty obtaining detailed guidance from reference materials.

2 EVALUATION: There are many references and publications which list procedures, methods, reports and other administrative matters to be accomplished in the preparation for and the actual movement of a unit. Even units with up-to-date and complete reference files found it difficult to quickly review all the pertinent references in preparation for the redeployment. Many units do not have all the required publications immediately available. To help overcome this handicap, USARV Headquarters is preparing checklists for distribution which will be general in nature and will cover the areas of personnel and administration; and logistics and facilities. These checklists will provide a summary of required actions which will help to reduce the research time required for redeployment at the lower unit level and to some degree lessen the impact of short notice of redeployment directives.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That all units in Vietnam prepare appropriately detailed checklists for reference in the event of future short notice redeployments.

(c) Liaison and Assistance to Redeploying Units.

1 OBSERVATION: Liaison and assistance groups provided excellent assistance to both redeploying units and to USARV Headquarters.

2 EVALUATION: A USARV Planning and Operating Group (UPOG) was established at Dong Tam, the 9th Infantry Division's stand-down location, and was given the authority to make on the spot decisions concerning redeployment. The UPOG assisted the 9th Infantry Division to plan for the redeployment and the turnover of facilities at Dong Tam. In addition, UPOG arranged for required outside technical assistance. Technical assistance was plentiful, however, a great deal of coordination was required because technical representatives often arrived singly or in

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

small groups on short notice. Based on the successful operations of the UPOG, roving USARV contact teams were dispatched to assist small, isolated, redeploying units. The redeploying units were provided with packets including flow diagrams and copies of guidance documents. Finally, a liaison officer from the 9th Infantry Division was assigned to USARV. This proved to be a valuable asset in keeping USARV informed of the status of the 9th Infantry Division's redeployment activities. The liaison officer plus the UPOG at Dong Tam, and the roving assistance teams, eliminated the requirement for extensive correspondence and burdensome reporting by redeploy' units.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That during future redeployments:

a The USARV Planning and Operations Group should be co-located with major units which have major installation responsibilities.

b The major deploying unit should provide a liaison officer to Headquarters, USARV.

c The use of roving assistance teams to help small, isolated units should be continued. These teams should include representatives of the major subordinate headquarters.

d Outside technical assistance requirements should be determined early and assistance provided as soon as possible by scheduled, consolidated teams.

(d) Communications Requirements for Redeployments.

1 OBSERVATION: Reliable communications are essential during the redeployment of units.

2 EVALUATION: Problems which require immediate resolution are inherent in large scale unit deployments. To provide instantly responsive communications between Headquarters, USARV and the 9th Infantry Division's Headquarters, point-to-point non-secure, secure voice and secure teletype circuits were established. Secure voice was infrequently used.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Secure teletype was not used after the second week of redeployment activity and only sparingly during the first two weeks. Non-secure point-to-point voice communication proved essential not only between USARV and the 9th Infantry Division, but also between USARV and ports of embarkation.

3 RECOMMENDATIONS:

a That the requirement for a secure point-to-point voice communication between USARV and a major redeploying unit be eliminated.

b That secure teletype communication be employed during the early stages of redeployment.

c That non-secure point-to-point voice communication be installed to all major redeploying units and at all ports of embarkation.

(e) Relocation of Non-redeploying Units.

1 OBSERVATION: Relocation of non-redeploying units requires detailed planning and coordination.

2 EVALUATION: There were over 40 non-divisional units located at Dong Tam that had been attached to, or were supporting the 9th Infantry Division. These units were subordinate to several different USARV major subordinate commands. The relocation dates of these units to other sites were dependent upon the stand-down dates or withdrawal dates of the 9th Infantry Division's functional elements which they supported. In the logistics and signal areas an increase in non-divisional unit strengths was required to take over when DISCOM logistics and signal elements started to stand-down. Facilities were sometimes lacking at the proposed relocation site. Identification and accountability for small detachments was a basic problem in some cases.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That planning for the relocation of non-deploying units be initiated as soon as the redeployment of a major unit is announced.

(f) Covering Forces.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

1 OBSERVATION: The requirement to stand-down in preparation for redeployment eventually prohibits the deploying unit from manning a covering force to secure the staging area.

2 EVALUATION: During stand-down a unit is responsible for security against attack by direct or indirect fire. Covering forces to perform this mission should possess a high degree of mobility and firepower. To accomplish this the 9th Infantry Division constituted a task force consisting of an infantry battalion, an airmobile company, an air cavalry troop, an artillery battery, a scout dog platoon, a sensor unit, and small supporting units (engineer, signal, etc.). This concept worked well initially and protected the division elements from attack during stand-down. However, as the last elements of the division prepared for redeployment, the division could no longer protect itself against rocket and mortar attacks. It was found that the replacing unit must be relied upon for this protection.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That a highly mobile task force be constituted to protect a redeploying unit which is withdrawing from active combat and that whenever possible, the task forces be composed of non-redeploying units.

(g) Customs Inspections.

1 OBSERVATION: There were no established procedures or trained personnel to conduct large scale customs inspections of personnel and equipment of deploying units.

2 EVALUATION: Existing custom facilities at ports of entry into Hawaii and CONUS are organized to receive only the normal flow of personnel rotating from overseas assignments. Operation KEYSTONE EAGLE required that the customs inspections be conducted in RVN as a part of the stand-down process. US Customs officials, by request of the Department of Defense, arrived in RVN to verify that customs procedures employed by the 9th Infantry Division and other redeploying units, conformed with the US Bureau of Custom's standards. These procedures were designed to prevent the intentional or accidental entry of contraband or other illegal items into Hawaii or CONUS. Deploying units are charged with the responsibility of conducting customs inspections.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

Technical guidance is provided by US Customs Officials and the unit or area provost marshals. Exact procedures and physical set-ups vary from unit to unit depending upon the size of the units and their assigned missions.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That on the ground technical assistance continue to be provided by the US Treasury Department, Bureau of Customs with the overall responsibility for customs clearance procedures remaining with the redeploying unit.

3. (C) TRAINING.

(a) (C) RVNAF Training.

1 OBSERVATION: RVNAF personnel lack the necessary skills to operate and maintain some complex facilities equipment.

2 EVALUATION: Certain facilities at Dong Tam were approved for turnover to the RVNAF, but were too complex for RVNAF personnel to operate without extensive OJT or formal training.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That plans for the turnover of complicated equipment or facilities to RVNAF consider the training time required when determining the effective date of the turnover. Plans must include provisions for OJT or formal training of RVNAF personnel.

(b) (U) Logistical Training.

1 OBSERVATION: Personnel from redeploying units were not familiar with documentation, classification, preservation and packing requirements for the overseas shipment of supplies and equipment.

2 EVALUATION: A key element in any successful large scale re-deployment is the proper documentation, marking and handling of supplies and equipment. MILSTAMP regulations are too complex and cumbersome to be used by untrained personnel and special consideration must be given to the preservation and packing processes. Technical service personnel may be available to provide supervisory assistance but to be

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

completely effective the unit must possess the general knowledge and fundamental skills required for this type of operation.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That prior to redeployment, contact teams from the 1st Logistical Command and the Army Material Command visit each redeploying unit to present classes and provide printed materials to key personnel.

4. (U) INTELLIGENCE. None.

5. (C) LOGISTICS.

(a) (U) Item: Excess Items.

1 OBSERVATION: Due to the large number of critical items and the deactivation of the 2d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, large quantities of supplies and material were slated for turn-in or lateral transfer.

2 EVALUATION: In the future, it is expected that the number of troops to be redeployed will exceed that of the 9th Infantry Division. It is doubtful whether the 1st Logistical Command will have the capability to support a larger redeployment if the redeployment is coupled with the deactivation of units. It is also apparent that as more units redeploy, the number and quantity of items left behind must be reduced and material returned to CONUS.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That the critical items list of equipment scheduled to remain in RVN be trimmed to the absolute essentials and that all other equipment be retrograded.

(b) (C) Item: Tariff Rates to Hawaii.

1 OBSERVATION: A tariff rate for shipment of personal baggage to Hawaii was not established for KEYSTONE EAGLE.

2 EVALUATION: At the on-set of the redeployments, there was no established tariff rate between RVN and Hawaii. Units would have had to provide their own packing material and transportation to the port. USARV

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

negotiated a bulk rate, on a one-time basis, with carriers that serve RVN. Units redeploying to Hawaii were thereby able to ship their hold baggage in the same manner as units redeploying to CONUS. That is the consignee was responsible for the personal baggage from the point of departure to the final destination.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That tariff rates, to cover future operations, be established for the shipment of personal baggage to other than CONUS destinations.

(c) (U) Item: Shipment of Personal Baggage.

1 OBSERVATION: Shipment of personal baggage to CONUS by USAR personnel prior to receipt of unit movement orders was required.

2 EVALUATION: Personnel desired to have their hold baggage available upon their arrival in CONUS. Current regulations preclude the shipment of personal baggage prior to receipt of unit movement orders. Experience reveals that normally the final unit movement orders are received only a few days prior to actual redeployment. USARV granted approval for subordinate commands to ship hold baggage prior to receipt of unit movement orders.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That when warranted, authority be delegated to USARV subordinate units to approve the shipment of personal baggage prior to receipt of unit movement orders, providing the unit is returning to CONUS for deactivation and the fund citation is available.

(d) (U) Property Accountability.

1 OBSERVATION: Property accountability of aviation related end items and sets was difficult to maintain because personnel without a completed tour were being infused to other in-country units and replaced by DEROS personnel. Similar problems were apparent in non-aviation units also but to a lesser degree.

2 EVALUATION: The nature of aviation unit redeployments required transfer of aviation related end items, sets, and parts to in-country

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

depot stocks, direct and general support aircraft maintenance units and out-of-country shipment. The processing of this equipment was delayed and the preparation of reports required as a result of shortages identified during physical inventory (e.g. surveys, quarterly droppage, statement of charges, etc.) were hampered by the transfer of responsible individuals. In addition, replacement personnel were not familiar with the circumstances surrounding the equipment loss. In some cases an attitude of indifference was evidenced.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That personnel turbulence in the supply areas be kept to a minimum. This will help to ensure an efficient property accounting process.

(6) (C) ORGANIZATION.

(a) (C) Reorganization of Redeploying Units.

1 OBSERVATION: The reorganization in RVN of redeploying units is not practical.

2 EVALUATION: The 9th Division was required to split its organization into three groups. One unit remained in Vietnam and the remainder of the division redeployed to CONUS and Hawaii. USARPAC desired that units redeploying to Hawaii be reorganized in RVN. Reorganization in RVN would have been nearly impossible because spaces, MOS's, individuals and material were all involved.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That units redeploy in their MTOE configuration as specified by approved plans and that reorganization take place at the new station under the direction of the gaining unit.

(b) (U) Fragmenting a Unit for Redeployment.

1 OBSERVATION: Splitting a unit prior to redeployment creates additional personnel turbulence.

2 EVALUATION: When a combat unit is fragmented, the sub-elements must be augmented with combat support and combat service support

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

capabilities. Such was the case when one brigade of the 9th Infantry Division remained in RVN as a separate brigade. Redeployment coupled with reorganizations creates additional personnel turbulence and temporarily lowers combat efficiency.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That unit integrity be maintained during redeployment activities and that reorganization be accomplished as a separate action.

(7) (C) OTHER.

(a) (C) Disposition of Dong Tam Base Facilities.

1 OBSERVATION: The orderly development of a plan for the disposition of Dong Tam Facilities was hampered by inappropriate ARVN representation and the lack of well coordinated policy guidance.

2 EVALUATION:

a MACV tasked the Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC) with the responsibility for developing a plan for disposition of facilities at Dong Tam, Headquarters for the 9th Infantry Division. This mission was accomplished by the formation of a committee which made recommendations pertaining to the disposition of facilities to the Commanding General, DMAC. The committee included representatives from DMAC, 9th Infantry Division, ARVN 7th Division, ARVN 4th ALC and USARV. The USARV representative was designated the committee chairman. MACV, DMAC and the DCG, USARV, provided guidance, which was quite specific, regarding the disposition of facilities, i.e., pre-engineered buildings, wooden buildings, air conditioners, base power, ice plant, water plant, refrigerators and installed equipment.

b The committee had considerable difficulty in following the command guidance in many cases. Certain recommendations, that were in contravention with guidance, were predicated on sound engineering principles and economics, e.g., the recommendation to leave a high voltage power plant and the water purification equipment. However, during all committee deliberations, the ARVN representatives were very defensive and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

considered every suggestion that USARV recover some facility or item of equipment as an effort on USARV's part to deny them an item to which they were entitled or required. Each item to be removed from Dong Tam appeared to constitute a "loss of face." MACV guidance also changed during the deliberations to reflect their concern for aiding the ARVN upgrade and modernization program.

c The end result of these difficulties was the loss to USARV of certain critical items of equipment, not critical to ARVN operations and considerable hard feelings between the parties.

3 RECOMMENDATION:

a That during the development of a plan for disposition of facilities, the ARVN representation be confined to the JGS level.

b That a basic policy be established pertaining to the disposition of facilities which takes into consideration actual ARVN requirements and capabilities, the need to upgrade and modernize ARVN, and USARV requirements.

(b) (U) Mess Accounts.

1 OBSERVATION: Difficulty was experienced when closing the open mess accounts of redeploying units.

2 EVALUATION: Experience gained from the redeployment of units has pointed out a requirement for the continuing purification of all accounts payable by open mess systems within Vietnam. Audits within USARV disclosed that this is a problem common to open mess accounts in RVN. Maintenance contracts must be given special attention to insure that adequate documentation is available to support completed work, repair parts received, and specific services requested and received by the secretary or custodian. In cases where documentation is insufficient or doubt exists as to the validity of the accounts payable, prompt action should be taken to clarify the situation with the contractor or other firms involved.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

3 RECOMMENDATIONS: Each open mess system should keep an up-to-date review of all accounts payable. This review should include as a minimum the following:

- a Review all contracts for completeness.
 - b Review all contracts for verification of dollar amounts.
 - c Review all contracts for terms of payment.
- (c) (U) Unit Fund Operations.

1 OBSERVATION: The strict interpretation of AR 230-1, regarding unit funds of infused reserve or national guard units, would not give units to be demobilized their full share of dividends.

2 EVALUATION: Upon release from active duty, reserve and national guard units are entitled to retain unit fund assets which were generated by reserve or national guard personnel during the period of active duty. AR 230-1 provides a formula for the computation of the amount to be retained, based on the average percentage of the unit's strength which was reserve or national guard personnel. Due to USARV's infusion program, this percentage was reduced. Therefore, reserve or national guard units were permitted to compute funds to be retained by using the reserve or national guard strength at the time of re-infusion instead of average reserve or national guard strength during the period. This procedure insures that reserve or national guard units retain their fair share of dividends.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That reserve or national guard units which are infused receive their full share of dividends by computing the percentage using the total strength of reserve or national guard members at demobilization.

- (d) (C) AR 220-10 Reports.

1 OBSERVATION: AR 220-10 requires the submission of a unit readiness report for redeploying units.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2 EVALUATION: The readiness report required by AR 220-10 is clearly intended for units moving in CONUS or redeploying from a non-combat theater to CONUS. Much of the information required by the report is not applicable to units withdrawing from combat, e. g., training status reports, and equipment reports for units that are redeploying without equipment. A USARV request for waiver of this reporting requirement was granted by DA and USARPAC for units redeploying from RVN.

3 RECOMMENDATION: All reporting requirements should be carefully scrutinized and kept to an absolute minimum to reduce unnecessary burdens on the redeploying unit.

(e) (C) Redeployment of Units/Elements of Other Military Components.

1 OBSERVATION: Future redeployments of units/elements of other military components may require the Army operation of communications facilities vacated by other military components.

2 EVALUATION: The redeployment of units/elements from other military components have a potential impact on communications support required from the Army. This is particularly applicable in those cases where communications facilities are vacated but are still required for rollup or residual forces. COMUSMACV OPLAN 183-69 states that the Navy and Air Force must provide a shortfall force for communications facilities until permanent reassignment of responsibility can be arranged. Indications are that the Army will be given ultimate responsibility for these communications facilities.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That MACV planners provide USARV with accurate and timely information on all communications facilities for which the Army will be assigned operational responsibility upon redeployment of communications elements of the other military components.

(f) (C) Redeployment of Signal Units/Elements.

1 OBSERVATION: Procedures must be established for the expeditious processing of changes to signal MTOE's resulting from the redeployment

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

of spaces from signal units or elements.

2 EVALUATION: Signal units generally have an area type mission and provide communication support to varied units and activities in a given geographical area. When a major unit redeploys, other units remaining in the area will require communication support. For this reason, it is impracticable and almost impossible to withdraw integral signal units as a part of the signal slice during redeployment operations. It is more feasible and practical to identify an appropriate number of spaces from a signal unit as being those which provided communication support to specific redeploying units.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That administrative procedures be established to approve withdrawing spaces from TOE signal units and for expeditious processing of such changes.

(g) (C) Disposition of NESTOR Equipment.

1 OBSERVATION: The disposition of NESTOR equipment on hand in the redeploying unit requires special consideration.

2 EVALUATION: NESTOR equipment is not TOE equipment and is issued under a special Department of the Army authorization. During the redeployment of the 9th Infantry Division a problem with the disposition of NESTOR equipment developed. Coordination with USARPAC, C-E and the Cryptologistics Support Center, Vietnam (CLSCV) resulted in instructions to the 9th Infantry Division to return all NESTOR equipment to CLSCV. The equipment will be retained and issued to other units in RVN. Other TOE items of this type belonging to redeploying units are shipped in accordance with crypto regulations.

3 RECOMMENDATIONS: That the OPLAN for units scheduled for redeployment, instruct units to contact USARV C-E for instructions regarding NESTOR equipment.

(h) (U) Photographic Support.

1 OBSERVATION: Photographic support must be available to deploying units.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for the Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2 EVALUATION: In planning the redeployment of the 9th Signal Battalion, 9th Infantry Division, the Photographic Section was scheduled for movement ahead of the remainder of the signal battalion and a large number of divisional units. This early stand-down and deployment deprived the 9th Infantry Division of its photographic capability during an important period in the unit's history. When this problem was identified, the 1st Signal Brigade was tasked to provide photographic support for the duration of the stand-down and redeployment.

3 RECOMMENDATION: That the photographic capability of an organization being deployed be retained until the latest possible time to assist in the collection of historic material.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



1 Incl
Distribution List

GEORGE L. MABRY, JR
Major General, US Army
Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOF-DT (31 Aug 69) 1st Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, U. S. Army Vietnam for Period Ending
31 July 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96358 15 OCT 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters concurs in subject report, as indorsed, except as indicated below.
2. (U) Reference paragraph 2h(1)(b), page 44. AR 614-30 contains guidance for computation of tour credit.
3. (C) Reference paragraph 2h(2)(d)(3), page 50. Secure voice communications should be utilized during planning stages and actual movement of major combat units to preclude sensitive information from being intercepted by the enemy.
4. (U) Reference paragraph 2h(7)(a), page 56. In addition the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, (AC/SMA) MACV should be requested to provide staff representation as all Army Vietnam (ARVN) authorizations, requirements, and entitlements under the Military Assistance Service Funded Program (MASFP) are the responsibility of AC/SMA. This would preclude argument concerning what ARVN is authorized to have, take or accept, and all items transferred will be subtracted from current authorized and approved MASFP as being delivered in-country, thereby cancelling delivery from COMUS. Further, many items of furniture and hardware are not supported by MASFP. Therefore, coordination with AC/SMA should be considered before other facilities are transferred to ARVN.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


D. A. TUCKER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CF:
CG, USARV

62

CONFIDENTIAL

81
AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Headquarters, United States Army,
Vietnam for Period Ending 31 July 1969, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DISTRIBUTION:

- 3 - OACSFOR thru CINCUSARPAC
- 2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
- 1 - OCMH
- 2 - CG, USACDC
- 1 - CG, USAMC
- 2 - CG, USCONARC
- 2 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH
- 1 - COMUSMACV
- 1 - COMUSMACV, ATTN: J2
- 1 - COMUSMACV, ATTN: J343
- 1 - COMUSMACV, ATTN: J4
- 1 - COMUSMACV, ATTN: SJS, Hist Br
- 1 - Comdt, USACGSC
- 1 - CG, XXIV CORPS
- 1 - CG, I FFORCEV
- 1 - CG, II FFORCEV
- 1 - CG, Americal Division
- 1 - CG, 1st Logistical Command
- 1 - ACofS, G1
- 1 - ACofS, G2
- 1 - ACofS, G3
- 6 - ACofS, G3 ATTN: DST
- 1 - ACofS, G4
- 1 - ACofS, C-E
- 1 - ACofS, G5
- 1 - SGS Hist Br
- 1 - AG (Ref Lib)
- 1 - Aviation
- 1 - Engineer
- 1 - Inspector General
- 1 - Information Office
- 1 - Provost Marshal
- 1 - Staff Judge Advocate
- 1 - Surgeon

Incl 1

63

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation shall be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		20. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL GROUP 4	
3. REPORT TITLE			
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, US Army Vietnam			
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May 69 to 31 July 69.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CG, US Army Vietnam			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
31 August 1969		66	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
a. PROJECT NO.		693179	
c. N/A		9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			
64			

DD FORM 1473
1 NOV 68

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification